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Abstract 
 
Contemporary subjection, notes Maurizio Lazzarato, has two very different dimensions, 
subjectivation (our production as subjects) and machinic enslavement (the way in which 
sub- and supra-individual human elements are put to work as cogs in complex machineries 
that are never simply technical machines). Although the latter form of subjection is 
increasingly dominant, critical theory almost always focuses on the former. With its 
intrinsically machinic functioning, cinema seems ideally placed to open up our machinic 
subjection to scrutiny. Can it become the Vertovian self-consciousness of a collective, 
machinic subject, or is it simply condemned to anticipate and embody the way in which 
consumer capitalism puts the human psyche and affectivity to work? Suggesting that such a 
polarised set of alternatives is too schematic, this article probes four contemporary, and 
very dissimilar, European films, sounding out their capacity to bring the machinic into view 
and make it available for self-reflexive engagement. The article draws its main theoretical 
inspiration from the work of contemporary social theorist, Maurizio Lazzarato, but also 
draws on other thinkers where relevant. The films discussed are Ma part du gâteau 
(Klapisch, 2011), Abenland (Geyrhalter, 2011), Lucy (Besson, 2014) and Vers Madrid: the 
Burning Bright (George, 2012).  
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Introduction 
Contemporary subjection, notes Maurizio Lazzarato, has two very different but 
complementary aspects. The more familiar relates to subjectivation and the different 
processes that constitute us as centred subjects with specific roles, responsibilities and 
rewards. The less often discussed but increasingly powerful aspect relates to our machinic 
enslavement, the way in which sub- and supra-individual physical, affective and intellectual 
human elements are inserted as cogs into larger assemblages or machineries that may 
include but are never limited to technical machines. The machinic, Lazzarato drily notes, is 
everywhere except in critical theory (2014, 13). To which one might add: the machinic is 
everywhere in cinema but nowhere to be seen. It is this invisible presence and its 
consequences for cinema’s capacity to engage with the machinic dimension of 
contemporary subjection that this article will probe. It will begin by looking at the opening 
of a generally unremarkable middle-brow French film, Ma part du gâteau / My Piece of the 
Pie (2011), by Cédric Klapisch, suggesting that it is only when cinema’s narrative drive is 
arrested that its machinic capacity can come to the fore and bring other unseen machineries 
into view. It will turn to the work of Lazzarato to develop the concepts of the machinic and 
of plural semiosis both in general and with respect to cinema, drawing on Jonathan Beller 
(2006) to supplement discussion of the latter. It will then apply the concepts discussed to 
three contemporary films, Nikolaus Geyrhalter’s austere documentary, Abendland (2011), 
Luc Bessson’s blockbuster, Lucy (2014), and Sylvain George’s experimental documentary 
about the Spanish indignados movement, Vers Madrid: the Burning Bright (2012). Although 
the films might seem a rather eclectic choice, they have been deliberately selected to probe 
the range, potential and limits of cinema’s engagement with the machinic at a time when 
our machinic enslavement is an increasingly dominant but still under-analysed aspect of our 
subjection.1 The liberatory potential of the machinic will also be developed as the article 
progresses.  
In her Undoing the Demos (2015), political theorist Wendy Brown discusses how 
neoliberalism reframes all the basic elements of democracy in economic terms, leaving 
democracy itself as a hollow shell. She describes how the state is subordinated to the 
economy, subjects and institutions redefined as firms, the polis evacuated as a space of 
meaningful debate and self-sovereign homo politicus subordinated to homo oeconomicus. 
Despite the careful precision of her analysis, she pays little attention to the rising power of 
the machinic and its hold upon us, except in her all too brief evocation of the ‘market 
metrics contouring every dimension of human conduct and institutions,’ a comment that 
cries out for development (2015, 176). Engagement with the machinic is surely a vital part 
of any attempt to rethink democratic renewal. With its own machinic powers, has cinema 
the capacity to become the self-consciousness of such an engagement? This question also 
underlies what follows.  
 
Cinema’s machinic powers 
Klapisch’s Ma part du gâteau recounts the improbable encounter between a working-class 
woman and the financial trader whose decisions caused the closure of the factory where 
she worked. It begins with her suicide attempt at a child’s birthday party, continues with her 
working as a cleaner for the trader, and ends when she forces him to come to Dunkirk to 
face the human consequences of his actions. The film undoubtedly casts light on evolutions 
in on-screen representation of workers and the difficulty of bringing the consequences of 
the systemic workings of financial capital within the frame of conventional narratives 
focussed on spatially circumscribed interpersonal dramas. By opposing a good ordinary 
woman and a heartless financier, it also joins a growing corpus of Crisis films which struggle 
to move beyond ultimately sterile moralising to a more politically productive framing.2 
Where it is at its most interesting, dare one say, is in its title sequence, when, for a brief 
period, narrative is interrupted.  
 The sequence begins conventionally enough with a series of shots from the point of 
view of someone carrying a birthday cake, amidst a hubbub of voices and with various faces 
coming into view. Quickly abandoning this human perspective, it shifts to an overhead, fast 
motion shot of the cake being divided into slices as it moves from its insertion in family 
festivity towards the abstraction of geometry and division. This decentring of the human 
group is confirmed by the montage sequence that follows. Taking its rhythm from an edgy, 
up tempo piece of music entitled ‘It’s up to you’ by Kraked Unit, it consists of the following: 
repeated shots of computer screens displaying lists of changing share prices and brightly 
coloured financial graphs or currency indices; lateral tracking shots from train windows of 
graffiti on concrete walls; views of a container port from a car window and a view of what 
we assume is the same car in the port; bird’s-eye shots of containers from increasing heights 
(figure 1); lateral tracking shots of posters for concerts or political groups; brightly coloured 
overhead shots of a carnival parade; low-angle lateral tracking shots of high buildings; close-
ups of hands clicking keyboard or calculator keys;  a fast-motion long shot of activity in a 
trading room; lateral tracking shots of women crossing a bridge in what looks like Paris; 
shots from increasing distance of a woman smoking alone on a balcony with the City of 
London behind her; fast-motion shots brought together through jump cuts of people on an 
array of escalators; a shot of hands holding a handrail, maybe on the metro; a shot of 
people dismounting a metro car; a shot of mainly besuited people going through a group of 
metal doors; a shot of people at a bus stop as buses pass through the frame. Finally, as the 
sequence unwinds, there is an over-the-shoulder shot of two girls looking out to sea leading 
to another overhead shot of the cake being cut into portions. Then, we see a series of short 
medium close-ups of excited faces and hear voices linked to them as excitement turns to 
alarm: someone has swallowed pills and the emergency services must be called. We are 
back in a story.  
 
 
Insert figure 1 here: Towards material abstraction, Ma part du gâteau, 2011. 
 
 
Insert figure 2 here: Bodily cogs, Ma part du gâteau, 2011.  
 
 
 Although the sequence derives a degree of tonal unity from the edgy music, in no 
way does it seek to achieve coherence at the level of representation. Instead, we are 
confronted with the gaps in meaning created by the juxtaposition of apparently 
unconnected people and places and of dissimilar and seemingly unrelated elements. 
Because of these gaps in meaning, we know that the meaning may be in the gaps. There is a 
relationship there but one we cannot perceive, perhaps precisely because, in its very 
relationality, it does not reside in any one location, person, or thing. If we do hypothesize a 
link, however, it almost will certainly give a prominent place to the computer screens with 
their share prices, graphs of market fluctuations and currency indices. These visualizations 
of data seem to carry an implicit potential for connectivity and reach denied to the more 
mundane and human elements present which are all components of traditional forms of 
cinematic representation. The implied prominence of financial data is also favoured by a 
decentring not only of individual humans but also of any anthropocentric perspective. This 
partly relates to the absence of facial close-ups and shot-reverse-shot set ups and the 
resultant impossibility of tying what is seen to someone’s point-of-view, an impossibility 
reinforced by repeated low angle and extreme high angle or aerial shots. But it also relates 
to the way in which we are presented with shots without humans (figure 1) or of 
anonymous groups or body parts engaged in co-ordinated, mechanical activities (the legs of 
commuters moving through doors (figure 2)) or functioning in a cog-like way, in 
combination with technological machines, as elements of some larger machinery (fingers on 
keyboards responding to market signals on computer screens). This machinic side of human 
activity is also brought to the fore by the rhythmic use of camera movement (the many 
tracking shots), the beat of the music and the repeated use of fast motion filming with its 
capacity to drive normally unnoticed patterns into view. 
 
Insert figure 3 here: Figuring cinema’s semiotic diversity, Ma part du gâteau, 2011. 
 
 The disruption of anthropocentric perspectives and temporalities also allows 
cinema’s semiotic diversity to become apparent. As the human face and especially the voice 
and language are marginalised (except in the sparse lyrics of the song), other elements 
assert themselves: pitch and rhythm; figures and graphs (figure 3); posters and graffiti; 
colours, shapes and forms; gestures and movements. Some, if not all, of these elements can 
routinely be found in film, of course, but they are typically subordinated to character, plot 
and language.3 Confirming this point, as the title sequence comes to an end and the plot 
begins to unfold, language reasserts its semiotic dominance and anthropocentric 
representation, with its facial close-ups, point-of-view shots, and psychologically motivated 
actions and reactions rediscovers its habitual primacy. It is as if, in the film’s title sequence 
and first scene, the whole drama of cinema had been encapsulated: a medium whose own 
machinery and semiotic pluralism makes it ideally equipped to probe the onward march of 
machinic subjection seems forever condemned to return us to a world of centred human 
subjects. That this should happen in a film committed to recounting the interplay of 
financial capitalism and ordinary workers in the aftermath of the financial crisis is 
extraordinarily telling. It would seem that, if we are to find the machinic in cinema, we will 
need to look ex-centrically, around the medium’s edges, at moments where cinema’s own 
subject-centring machinery is paused, arrested or has yet to come into play.4  
 
Lazzarato, machinic subjection and semiotic pluralism  
The theoretical dimension of what precedes clearly needs to be expanded. It is here that the 
work of Lazzarato can help us. An Italian social theorist based in France, Lazzarato’s key 
influences are Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Lazzarato’s main project in 
relation to Foucault is to develop his work on the production of subjectivity under neo-
liberalism, especially but not only because, written in neo-liberalism’s early period and 
before our current age of austerity and debt, Foucault’s account might seem rather 
ambivalent if not positively sanguine (Lazzarato 2011, 2015). Lazzarato is indebted to 
Deleuze and Guattari for their account of the machinic and to Guattari for his unorthodox 
theory of semiotics, the latter being essential to an understanding of the complementary 
workings of both subjectivation and machinic enslavement.  
 It is worth re-emphasising, to begin with, that the concept of the machine, as 
deployed by Lazzarato, following Deleuze and Guattari, relates to something much more 
than the technical machine as a prosthetic tool deployed by a human subject. The machine 
is rather a functional whole or assemblage, incorporating material, semiotic and incorporeal 
as well as human elements (2014, 81). Rather than the factory, for example, being simply a 
container for machines, it is better seen as a machine itself, incorporating human elements 
into an assemblage involving not simply technical machines but also material flows and 
different forms of semiosis (diagrams, plans, balance sheets etc.). If, in Marx’s time, the 
factory was the main site where machinic enslavement was concentrated, now, with the 
spread of mass and social media, mass consumption and information technology, the 
machinic is everywhere. While mechanisms of subjectivation produce discrete individuals by 
allocating social and economic roles, responsibilities, rewards and property rights, machinic 
subjection shatters the unity of the individual by incorporating sub- and supra-individual 
elements into machinic assemblages. As Lazzarato explains: 
 
Not only is the individual of a piece with the machinic assemblage but he [sic] is also 
torn to pieces by it: the component parts of subjectivity (intelligence, affects, 
sensations, cognition, memory, physical force) are no longer unified in an ‘I,’ they no 
longer have an individuated subject as referent. Intelligence, affects, sensations, 
cognition, memory, and physical force are now components whose synthesis no 
longer lies in the person but in the assemblage or process (2014, 17).  
 
Mechanisms of subjectivation are territorialising, in the Deleuzian sense: that is, they name, 
separate, specify and localize. Machinic enslavement, in contrast, is radically 
deterritorialising and dissolves specific identifications into broader processes. Both are 
necessary for the functioning of contemporary capitalism, one to allocate and justify roles, 
ownership and rewards, the other to insert human elements into complex assemblages 
from which profit can be extracted. If this seems too abstract, we might look at how it 
applies to something like mortgage debt in the American ‘sub-prime’ crisis. On the one 
hand, the mortgage system needed particular individuals to be financially and morally 
responsible for the repayment of specific sums to named banks with geographically located 
properties as collateral: on the other, debts were detached from individuals and locations, 
packaged up, traded, added to balance sheets, rated, speculated upon and reprocessed in 
complex derivatives. The functioning of the mortgage market required both of these very 
different but ultimately complementary machineries. In a similar way, a social media 
platform like Facebook constantly insists that we are unique, psychologically-rounded 
individuals, with our profiles, histories, friends, tastes and photographs. Yet at the same 
time, it works ceaselessly to plug fragments of our attention and affects into broader 
machineries that measure the popularity of pages and themes, select which content to 
show us, and monetize our data, gathering it up and selling it on to advertisers or, as we are 
now only too well aware, political campaigns. 
 It is because subjectivity is traversed and indeed constituted by both individualising 
and machinic processes in this way that Lazzarato is scathing about the work of leading 
contemporary theorists such as Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Judith Butler or Slavoj Zizek 
who all, he suggests, focus on subjectivity and subjectivation to the exclusion of the 
machinic and thus render themselves incapable of generating an adequate account of 
contemporary subjection and how it can be opposed (2014, 13). In a similar way, he is 
critical of a similar range of thinkers for granting undue centrality to language in the realm 
of politics (Rancière) and production (Paolo Virno in his account of cognitive capitalism) and  
in the constitution of the subject (Butler and Zizek) (2014, 16-17). Machinic enslavement 
largely by-passes language and relies on a different form of semiotics.   
 Lazzarato turns to Guattari for his account of semiosis. The latter commences his 
four-part categorisation with a-semiotic signs that include things like crystal structures or 
DNA which, although they might seem to belong outside the normal domain of semiosis, 
contain information and shape forms, giving the lie to any sense of the inertness of matter 
or the objectified passivity of nature. Guattari’s second category, symbolic semiotics, is 
initially associated with early human societies and relates to gesture, art, music, and dance, 
forms that, in their egalitarian co-existence and interaction, were an integral part of group 
life as opposed to something that sought to describe it from some exterior location. The 
third category, signifying semiotics, relates primarily to language, with its capacity to define 
and fix identities and meanings while separating a world of representation from the world 
of action. The fourth and final kind is what, following Guattari, Lazzarato calls asignifying 
semiotics and which encapsulates graphs, diagrams, digital data, computer code, balance 
sheets and so on (Lazzarato 2014, 39-49, 55-94).  
 How do Lazzarato’s discussion of forms of subjection and plural semiosis come 
together? As he himself puts it: 
 
Social subjection mobilizes signifying semiotics, in particular language, aimed at 
consciousness and mobilizes representations with a view to constituting an 
individuated subject …[M]achinic enslavement functions based on asignifying 
semiotics … which do not involve consciousness and representations and do not 
have the subject as referent (Lazzarato 2014, 39) 
 
Language plays vital roles of subordination, separation and reterritorialization that are 
essential for the functioning of capitalism. Firstly, the multiple, trans-individual, group or 
tribe-centred forms of symbolic semiotics must be ‘hierarchized and subordinated to 
language,’ (Lazzarato 2014, 69) in order to produce a defined reality (Lazzarato 2014, 72). 
Secondly, in the face of capital’s capacity, as described famously by Marx, to melt all that is 
solid into air, language fixes the individuated identities, properties, roles and rewards 
without which unequal social relations could not be maintained (Lazzarato 2014, 94). Yet, 
precisely because of this capacity to stabilise representations, language lacks the mobility 
and flexibility that capital requires for its functioning. It is here that asignifying semiotics 
comes into its own: unencumbered by attachment to sedimented meanings, it is able to 
perform the vital roles of capture, evaluation and transfer that are so essential to capitalism 
as it harnesses and extracts value from a range of divergent activities (2014, 41). Moreover, 
while language and representation necessarily separate themselves from the ‘reality’ they 
describe, asignifying semiotics intervenes directly in material flows. As Lazzarato puts it, 
‘Instead of referring to other signs, asignifying signs act directly on the real, for example, in 
the way that the signs of computer language make a technical machine like the computer 
function, that monetary signs activate the economic machine, that the signs of a 
mathematical equation enter into the construction of a bridge or an apartment building, 
and so on’ (Lazzarato 2014, 40-41). It is this reach and power that explain why, in the age of 
the ascendancy of financial capital and of the digital, asignifying semiotics has become the 
dominant form of semiotics.  
At this stage, we might be tempted to throw up our hands in despair and suggest 
that, caught between the machineries of subjectivation and signifying semiotics, on the one 
hand, and machinic enslavement and asignifying semiotics, on the other, we are effectively 
trapped; pinned by one set of mechanisms; shattered and turned into cogs by the other. 
Yet, Lazzarato leaves room for hope. Firstly, he notes that neoliberal subjectivation is in 
crisis, that, in the age of debt and austerity, the previously preferred subjective figure of the 
entrepreneur-of-the-self can no longer maintain any pretence of general applicability (2014, 
9-11; 2013, 14). Secondly, he points to the tension between subjectivation and machinic 
enslavement; while one individualizes and territorializes, the other deterritorializes and 
potentially opens a space to imagine less oppressive reterritorializations. Thirdly, and 
relatedly, because Lazzarato frames machineries of both enslavement and subjectivation in 
terms of Deleuzian assemblages, with the contingent articulations that implies, and in 
contrast to more rigid systemic models, he leaves room for progressive reassemblages.   
 What is the place of cinema and its different machineries within all this? 
Predicatably, Lazzarato draws on Guattari again as he analyses the combination of symbolic, 
signifying and asignifying semiotics at work in cinema. He cites the following list: 
 
-The phonic fabric of expression that refers to spoken language (signifying 
semiology); 
-The sonorous but non-phonic fabric that refers to instrumental music (asignfiying 
semiotics); 
-The visual fabric that refers to painting (both symbolic and asignifying semiotics); 
-The gestures and movements of the human body, etc. (symbolic semiologies); 
-The durations, movements, breaks in space and time, gaps, sequence, etc., that 
make up asignifying intensities (Lazzarato 2014, 109) 
 
He adds wistfully,  
 
The cinema, whose effects derive above all from its use of asignifying symbolic 
semiotics … represented for a brief moment the possibility of moving beyond 
signifying semiologies, of bypassing personalist individuations, and opening up 
possibilities that were not already inscribed in dominant subjectivations (Lazzarato 
2014, 109 [my emphasis]).  
 
While this remark echoes Lazzarato’s more general discussion of the tension between 
signifying and asignifying semiotics, his specific judgement on cinema seems pessimistic: he 
suggests that its semiotic diversity is subordinated to the signifying ‘machine,’ so that the 
film industry functions as a form of group psychoanalysis, ‘powerfully aiding in the 
construction of roles, and especially, in the fabrication of the individuated subject and his 
[sic] unconscious’ (Lazzarato 2014, 108). Yet, he also notes that cinema’s semiotic diversity 
opens it up to readings prioritizing different semiotic elements which, through their very 
diversity, reintroduce ‘ambiguity, uncertainty, and instability into denotation and 
signification’ (Lazzarato 2014, 110). This is what I sought to bring out with my own reading 
of the opening of Ma part du gâteau: the title sequence highlights the astonishing semiotic 
richness of cinema and its potential to bring our insertion into various interconnected 
machineries into the open. But it also underlines how, once the story proper gets under 
way, this richness is put in the service of the machinery of individuation, psychological 
motivation and a conventional cause-effect narrative chain. It is only by reading around the 
edges, ex-centrically, that we can bring cinema’s subordinated elements into view.  
 This sense that cinema retains an unrealised or forever subordinated capacity for 
engagement with the machinic can be further developed if we look at how Lazzarato and 
Beller analyse the work of Soviet film-makers. For both thinkers, despite their differences, 
the development of cinema’s powers has to be understood within the broader context of 
the capacity of industrial and consumer capitalism to organize perception. Both also focus 
on Dziga Vertov as the still unsurpassed example of a cinema that radically reorientates the 
medium’s powers in progressive directions.  
 Lazzarato discusses Vertov in a text whose title, ‘The cine-eye’s war machine and the 
movement of the Kinoks mobilised against the Spectacle’ (my translation), explicitly 
references Guy Debord. The latter famously defined the Spectacle as a social relationship 
mediated by images. Reversing the dynamic, Lazzarato suggests that the real task is to move 
beyond critique of the Spectacle and to develop cinema’s capacity to constitute and 
organize the social body. He notes that the machineries that produces visibility, and 
therefore cinema, under capitalism are semiotic, technological, social and aesthetic. But he 
observes that, since Vertov, attempts to create a radical cinema have been aesthetic, 
political or social in isolation and have failed to generate the necessary reworking of the 
cinematic machinery in its combined facets. In contrast, Vertov’s aesthetic and socio-
political re-appropriation of cinema’s powers brought together the capacity of the camera 
and montage to decentre an anthropocentric experience of time, duration and velocity, and 
a collective seeing and thinking that decentred the director-auteur. As the self-
consciousness of a human-technological hybrid, this revolutionary cinema emphasised the 
capacity of the machinic to free us from individualising subjectivations and not simply to 
enslave us (Lazzarato 2005).  
 Beller’s not dissimilar starting point is the proto-cinematic nature of capitalism itself. 
He suggests that, by the time of the emergence of industrial capitalism, factories and 
markets had already begun to set image-commodities in motion (Beller 2006, 10). Also 
echoing Debord, he notes that, because of commodity fetishism, objects became images of 
themselves, made themselves ‘photogenic’ (desirable) and entered into circulation (Beller 
2006, 58, 77). By connecting things and processes, Beller adds, money necessarily also 
performs its own montage, capturing different materials and activities, extracting them 
from specific contexts and editing them into its flows and processes (Beller 2006, 54). With a 
similar capacity to capture objects and processes of radically different type or scale within 
the general equivalence of its frame (a perception Beller takes from Deleuze) and operate 
its own montage, cinema is clearly a product of this broader context (Beller 2006, 105). But 
it also intensifies specific tendencies within it. Anticipating capitalism’s more general 
evolution, it amplifies the affective dimension of commodity fetishism by capturing and 
putting to work the imagination and desire of spectators (Beller 2006, 21). Because it is 
organically connected to capitalism in this way, it has the potential to become the self-
consciousness of the workings of capitalist production (Beller 2006, 56).  This is Vertov’s 
wager. As Beller puts it, ‘Vertov uses the cinematic machine to assemble the movement of 
matter in such a way that this movement becomes precisely the consciousness of material 
relations’ (2006, 38). Like capital itself, Vertov’s cinema gives an abstract value to each 
concrete moment captured in its frame. But where capitalist abstraction takes the form of 
exchange-value, Vertov’s shots point towards a different abstraction, ‘the totality of social 
production’ (Beller 2006, 49). For them to achieve this, montage, with its ability to locate 
meaning in relationships, has to intervene. While Eisensteinian montage emphasizes the 
dialectical collision between shots, the Vertovian variant, ‘is made of connections that 
dismantle the phenomenological (reificatory) effects of capital circulation and create a new 
relation to the social product at once collective and personal’ (2006, 45). This brave project 
ultimately fails, however, because Vertov over-concentrates on cinema’s capacity to 
generate consciousness and thereby fails to foresee capital’s ‘total penetration of the 
sensorium’ (Beller 2006, 70).  
 This is where Eisenstein comes into the argument. In his desire to provide a ‘libidinal 
supplement’ that would engage the Soviet masses (Beller 2006, 118), he unwittingly 
anticipated the path consumer capitalism would take as it plugged itself deeper into the 
human psyche and put it to work. Pavlov, the celebrated physiologist, focused on controlling 
the reflexes of the biological organism. Frederick Taylor, the equally famous mechanical 
engineer, sought to perfect the scientific management of the production process. Effecting a 
synthesis of the two, Eisenstein developed a cinematic machinery that could mediate 
between the individual psyche and the needs of a new society (Beller 2006, 117-128). 
Preferring the affective hammer blows of his film-fist to Vertov’s cerebral film-eye, he 
endeavoured to submit the psyche to a new wave of industrialisation (Beller 2006, 131). 
Ironically, it would be this vision that would triumph, but in the service of the capitalist 
revolution rather than the communist one.  
 Again, one is tempted to throw up one’s hands in despair. If all cinema since Vertov 
has either failed to maintain a radicalism that, in any case, was profoundly rooted in the 
very specific circumstances of pre-Stalinian revolutionary Russia, or has become enrolled, 
more or less uniformly, in capitalism’s drive to harness the human psyche, it becomes very 
difficult to differentiate between films or to retain any faith in cinema’s powers. Here, it is 
worth contrasting Beller and Lazzarato. While both emphasize Vertov’s re-assemblage of 
the cinematic machine to generate collective self-consciousness, their readings are 
different. By opposing Vertov to Eisenstein in such a polarised way, Beller leaves little space 
for a cinema that speaks to both affect and rational cognition. In contrast, Lazzarato is less 
focused on rational consciousness per se and more on film’s capacity to connect to affect, 
perception and cognition. He leaves room for cinema to decentre the human and the 
individual without automatically plugging us into the machineries of consumer capitalism. 
He also accentuates, as we saw, the semiotic excess of cinema which gives even 
conventional films the potential to overflow the anthropocentric narratives that seek to 
domesticate them. Building on these insights, I will now return to the contemporary period 
as I seek to develop a more nuanced account of cinema’s engagement with the machinic.  
 
 
Contemporary European film and machinic enslavement 
The pre-title sequence of Geyrhalter’s Abendland begins with a nocturnal medium shot of a 
camera-like object on a hydraulic mounting emerging from a flat, dark surface (figure 4). 
The middle ground is occupied by a field with an unidentifiable crop. There are some lights 
in the background of the shot. As we watch, the object rotates, tilts and stops, before 
rotating a little more. We hear the whir of what sounds like an electric motor. We cut to an 
enclosed space in which a man in medium shot is watching what looks like an infra-red 
image on a monitor as, using a joy-stick on a desk, he controls the camera producing the 
image. Speaking to someone off-screen, he notes that there is nothing living to be seen, 
before identifying first a rabbit, then a patrol car. We cut to a more distant shot of the 
camera we saw at the start as it slowly retracts into what we now see is a van. Two men 
emerge from the rear compartment of the vehicle and drive off. The filming camera holds 
the shot for several seconds after the van has left. We cut to a very different location: we 
are in a shanty-style camp where one man is explaining to a group clustered around him 
that they will be transferred to other camps but that family groups will be kept near to each 
other. After several shots of the man and the group in animated discussion, we cut to a long 
shot of the same space, with all the shanties razed to the ground. Roughly in the centre of 
the shot, there is a small jet of water that presumably once supplied a tap. We cut to 
another darkened space, this time in what we deduce to be a neo-natal intensive care unit. 
By a cot, in long shot, a nurse cradles a child. Another shot shows a nurse in medium close 
up attaching a fragile infant to tubes and monitors. The noise of machinery mingles with the 
faint noise of a child crying. We cut to a medium shot of another infant with multiple 
sensors attached to them. The noise of a nurse’s movements mixes with the whir of 
machinery. We cut to a long shot of a nurse by some computer screens near a cot. The 
nurse leaves the room but the shot is held for a good number of seconds. Our eyes are 
drawn to the bright glow of the screens. We cut to what looks like an empty parliament 
chamber. 
 
Insert figure 4 here: The border’s machinic eye, Abendland, 2011. 
 
 What are we to make of this?  Clearly, we are not dealing with the kind of 
documentary that seeks to develop characters or track their lives or opinions. Yet, clearly 
too, the montage invites us to make connections between shots and look for patterns. The 
first and third sequence have obvious resemblances. They foreground technologies and how 
they form complex assemblages with human actors. What we witness in the first sequence 
is an enhanced, human-machine seeing that is itself presented as part of a larger 
assemblage, which we presume to be a border, an apparatus in which the other car, the one 
seen on the monitor, also plays a part. What we witness in the third sequence is what one 
might call cyborg life involving new born babies plugged into breathing apparatuses, 
incubation units and an array of monitors which convert their vital signs into data which is in 
turn reconverted into graphs and coloured lights which ‘speak’ to the nurse. But, like the 
first sequence, by framing people alongside machines or showing functional spaces without 
visible people, the sequence also invites us to situate the humans and machines as part of a 
larger assemblage, in this case the neo-natal unit. The second sequence seems different. 
With its medium shots of individuals and groups interacting and its re-centring of human 
faces and voices, it potentially moves us towards a traditionally anthropocentric cinema. But 
the fact that the film never returns to the location or the characters takes it in a different 
direction. The sequence’s over-arching meaning emerges from its positioning in a broader 
assemblage of shots and its relationship to the film’s title. The latter, Abendland, is an old-
fashioned term for the West, but, meaning ‘land of the evening,’ also points to the film’s 
deliberate focus on the night-time, when artificial lights are most visible, and the hum of 
machines continues even as other activities cease. If, in Man with a Movie Camera, each 
shot, whatever concrete activity it foregrounds, points, as Beller observes, towards an 
abstract sense of the ‘totality of social production,’ here the abstraction that all shots and 
sequences point to is Europe or the ‘Occident’ and the assemblage of socio-technical 
machineries that produce it. Rather than focussing on any particular group of migrants, the 
camp sequence therefore invites us to place the sorting and displacement of migrants 
between the production of borders, on the one hand, and the elaborate machinery of care 
attached to (only) some fragile lives on the other.  
 
Insert figure 5 here: The newsroom’s enunciatory machinery, Abendland, 2011. 
 
 Other sequences focus on the European parliament, a beer festival, a care home, a 
papal speech in St Peter’s Square, a CCTV centre in London, a news room, a demonstration 
against a nuclear waste train, an on-line pornography studio, a highly mechanised 
crematorium and a staggeringly large discotheque. Despite their diversity, all the sequences 
revolve around specific machinic assemblages in circumscribed though unnamed spatial 
locations. Not all accord prominence to technical machines in their imbrication with 
elements of human labour or attention, although some such as the newsroom sequence do. 
The latter begins by showing someone we assume to be a producer in a control room, with 
a colleague beside him and multiple screens in front of him. We move to a long shot of the 
back of a newsreader’s head (figure 5). Beyond him we see a monitor with a reporter on 
location. Facing us but behind him is an autocue with the text to be read. In the background, 
as is typical in many modern news reports, we see people at their desks. The choice of 
shots, their framing and their editing within the sequence all come together to decentre and 
fragment the individual face and voice normally foregrounded by the news machine. 
Individual humans are shown as components of an enunciatory machinery. There might 
therefore seem to be a clear contrast between this sequence and those involving the 
discotheque or the beer festival. But what is striking about the discotheque sequence is the 
way in which its refusal to prioritize any particular face allows the mass choreography of 
human bodies, affects and gestures by musical rhythm to come to the fore. Although it 
lingers on certain individuals, the beer festival sequence also conveys a sense of mass co-
ordination. It contains, for example, a shot of three men filling beer glasses, one providing 
empty ones, another filling two at a time, a third moving the full ones away. The 
differentiation of tasks might suggest individualisation but the men’s rhythmic, co-ordinated 
and programmed gestures and the mise-en-scène of multiplicity (the many glasses) point 
towards a becoming-mechanical of the human body (figure 6). More broadly, tying each 
activity into the broader functionality of the whole, the sequence’s editing emphasises how 
the festival itself is a complex assemblage of machinic elements of which synchronised 
affect and movement are mere parts. 
 
Insert figure 6 here: Becoming machine-like, Abendland, 2011. 
 
 In its capacity to generate an overarching sense of the production of Europe by 
assembling sequences of geographically dispersed machinic processes, Geyrhalter’s film 
rivals the scope and ambitions of Vertov’s masterwork. Like its predecessor, it is able to 
bring the machinic to the fore by decentring narrative and the individual psyche. Although it 
is much less obviously a montage-film, editing, cinema’s own core asignifying semiotic, is 
nonetheless essential to its move away from the concrete and specific to the more general 
and abstract. In contrast to Vertov’s work though, it does not belong to a cinema that 
aspires to be the immanent self-consciousness of a machinic revolution. Rather, it evidences 
a faith in some of the traditional tools of non-mainstream film to bring usually unnoticed 
socio-technical machineries into visibility while remaining carefully separate from them. 
Editing, the long take, the long shot, and judicious framings and camera placements all 
come together to decentre individual faces and voices and bring machines, the plural 
semiotics linked to their functioning, and the imbrication of human cogs within them, into 
view and audibility. This is a cinema that invites contemplation and distance, its own quiet 
machinery clearly distinct from the machineries of exclusion, care, politics, surveillance or 
news production that it invites us to observe. It is perhaps telling that in the final shot of the 
film, a long tracking shot in the discotheque, the assembled revellers part in front of the 
camera as if it were an alien object, a cog from the wrong kind of machine, disrupting their 
absorption.  
 Lucy, Besson’s English-language, CGI-laden, Scarlett Johansson vehicle is different in 
almost every imaginable way from Abendland, its own spectacular and affective machinery 
seeking to plug into our psyches and put them to work rather than generate quiet 
detachment. Predictably, it has a cartoon-like plot. Its eponymous heroine (Johansson) is 
manoeuvred by her wastrel boyfriend, Richard (Pilou Asbæk), into delivering an attaché 
case to Mr Jang (Min-sik Choi), a mob boss. The bag contains four bags of a synthetic version 
of a hormone, CPH4, supposedly released in the mother’s womb to trigger a baby’s 
development. Lucy, along with three other characters, is made to become a drugs mule by 
having her abdomen cut open and a bag inserted. When she resists a sexual assault by one 
of her gaolers, she is kicked in the stomach, the bag bursts and a transformation begins. The 
chemical unlocks her unused brain capacity. She develops super-intelligence and super-
sensitivity. She learns Mandarin almost instantly from a laptop and quickly becomes a 
medical expert but can also perceive natural flows (the rising sap in trees) and her own 
bodily processes. She can read the gangster’s memories by pressing her thumbs into his 
head. She flies to Paris (it being a French film, despite appearances) to meet up with 
Professor Norman (Morgan Freeman), an authority on brain potential, and enlists the help 
of a French policeman, Pierre del Rio (Amr Waked) to round up the other mules and seize 
the remaining product. Meanwhile, her powers continue to develop: she can shift shape but 
also risks losing form altogether, as notably occurs as she is flying to Paris and starts to 
dissolve into a stream of molecules before regaining control. She can also interact at 
frightening speeds with laptops, perform telekinesis and see, sift and listen to a myriad of 
mobile phone conversations. She finds Norman and his team of scientists, absorbs the 
remaining hormone and breaks out of her body, connecting to whatever electronic devices 
(camera, copier or computer) there are in the laboratory. She also begins to travel in time 
and meets Lucy, the humanoid mother of humanity, touching finger tips, echoing 
Michelangelo’s fresco ‘the Creation of Adam’, in a way that suggests she may have 
retrospectively triggered a matrilineal human evolution. Mr Jang, still on her trail, breaks 
through the police cordon, and fires his gun at the back of her head only to see her body 
dissolve and be shot himself by del Rio. The dark reddish-black substance Lucy has become, 
and which has merged with all the electronic devices, forms a hand and passes a pen-drive-
like object to the Professor who concludes that it must represent the next generation of 
computer. When the policeman wonders where she is, she takes over the screen of his 
mobile phone to message, ‘I am everywhere.’  
In some ways, Lucy might respond well to the kind of ideological analysis that Fredric 
Jameson performed on Jaws (Spielberg, 1975). Jameson famously read that film in terms of 
how it invited the spectator to participate vicariously in the triumphant alliance of state 
authority (Roy Scheider’s sheriff) and science and technology (Richard Dreyfuss’s 
oceanographer) even as an older America of small business, the war and the New Deal 
(Robert Shaw’s small fisherman) was cast aside (Jameson 1979, 142-144). In Lucy’s case, we 
are invited to bask in the reflected glow of the utopian alliance between the eponymous 
everywoman / superheroine, Professor Norman’s scientific knowledge and Inspector del 
Rio’s state authority, with the discarded figure being Mr Jang. The latter is ostensibly just a 
gangster, but, a deeper level, and in a familiar way, embodies the unacceptable face of a 
capitalism for which people are either disposable tools or customers and for which human 
potential (the maternal growth hormone) is simply a resource. This facile and rather clichéd 
resolution of contradictions through the narrative elimination of their undesirable 
consequences is relatively uninteresting. Where the film is more noteworthy is in how it 
seeks to reconcile another related set of tensions, this time between the individual and the 
machinic, the human and the technological, a contradiction perhaps best expressed in the 
closing scene when Lucy disappears into technology but is still fully present to herself and 
others, although now ubiquitous in a god-like manner.  
 The film’s central conceit, a long-since discredited claim recycled by Professor 
Norman, is that humans only use 10% of their cerebral capacity, the release of the unlocked 
90% being triggered in Lucy’s case by ingestion of the synthetic hormone. What I would 
suggest is that this reference to un-accessed brain-power is a displaced way of talking about 
the gap between collective humano-technological potential (our alienated machinic powers) 
and the paltry capacities of individual humans. Rather than asking us how we might 
collectively take control of this resource, the film instead offers us the fantasy of the re-
empowered individual. The initial Lucy, with a branded coffee in her consumer hand, is our 
mirror image as, an unaware cog, she blunders into the (criminal) machinery in which her 
body, a mere container, is to be put to work. In contrast, the new, empowered Lucy masters 
everything surrounding her, even those things and processes to which humans do not 
habitually have access. Apart from her improbable powers of tele-kinesis, she can control 
radio and television signals and access and sort mobile phone signals. Her initial interaction 
with laptops simply allows her to plunder and internalize the resources of the internet but 
she later herself merges with a range of devices including mainframes and takes on the 
ubiquity of the network itself. She can not only read human languages: she has access to the 
signals in her own brain and those of others. More broadly, she can feel the rotation of the 
earth, biological flows and the circulation of her own blood. The movements of life and 
matter become accessible to her as information even as she gains access to all the different 
forms of semiosis that surround her, including, crucially, the asignifying ones that normally 
by-pass human senses. At the same time, and in an implicitly interconnected way, she 
develops the capacity to reshape her own form, be it her hair colour, her limbs or, 
ultimately, her brain.  
 At this stage, we seem to have come full circle and returned to an enhanced version 
of the ideological reading I initially suggested but with the role of the everywoman figure 
(Lucy) fleshed out in a way that brings the contradictions of contemporary subjectivity to 
the fore. Lucy is contemporary of the age of information, bio-engineering, and networked 
global connectivity but, as the film progresses, she moves from simply being a resource, 
terminal or flexible and semiotically limited cog who takes form from whatever assemblage 
she is inserted into (including drug trafficking) to being the semiotically omni-literate agent 
of her own flexibility and connectivity. What plays out over her body therefore is the 
fundamental tension between the two forms of subjection: subjectivation and machinic 
enslavement, one which centres and territorializes us, the other which tears us apart. The 
tension takes on dramatic visual form in the aeroplane sequence when, thanks to the CGI, 
Lucy starts to dissolve into a stream of matter and energy only to pull herself back together, 
ready for her later apotheosis when she becomes one with networked machinery while 
remaining fully herself. Between these two emblematic moments, what is played out is the 
threat of the dissolution that the contemporary subject faces at the hands of machinic 
enslavement and its narrative containment. The role of CGI within the drama is crucial. 
Although its ostentatious presence, and the digital processes that we know lie behind it, 
could draw our attention away from the merely human to cinema’s repressed machinic and 
asignifying substrate, it is in fact used to bring the threat of human disintegration within the 
realm of representation and narrative all the better to contain it. This is the condition of our 
continued enjoyment: having allowed our individual and collective affectivity to be plugged 
into the cinematic machine, we are rewarded by the reassurance that the heroine has not 
simply been absorbed. We share the policeman’s concern that she may have disappeared 
but, like him, we are persuaded by Morgan Freeman’s avuncular confirmation that she is 
somehow still there as guarantor of an anthropocentric future.5  
 George’s Vers Madrid, a poetic, black and white documentary about the Spanish 
‘occupy the square’ movement of 2011, moves us diametrically away from Lucy’s kind of 
mainstream cinema but, in its proximity to its protagonists, also refuses the detached 
observation of Abendland. The film mainly consists of sequences showing aspects or phases 
of the occupation in the Plaza del Sol. There are sequences of classic occupy-style meetings, 
with their turn-taking, hand gestures and search for consensus. We also see smaller, more 
intimate, working group discussions. There are more ludic interludes; a sequence of music 
and dancers; another sequence with someone in costume imitating the then right-wing 
mayoress of Madrid leading a symbolic poor person on a lead while haranguing the crowd; 
two brief sequences with collective drumming on a corrugated barrier (figure 7); a montage 
of hand-made posters and artworks that gives way to more discussions. There are 
sequences of construction (building temporary structures) and maintenance (a cheerful 
clear-up after a downpour). There are sequences when the broadly static occupation gives 
way to a march, with defiant chants, drums and singing. But there are also repeated shots of 
what we take to be a police helicopter and of uniformed police officers watching or moving 
in. The collision foreshadowed by such shots develops into sequences of active 
confrontation with rapid movement of both protestors and officers. All these shots and 
sequences come together to suggest, not so much an exact chronology of the movement, 
but a series of moods and intensities loosely structured by a broad progression from the 
ludic and consensual to the confrontational. Interspersed in their succession, we see a less 
tightly related series of shots and sequences that look to a broader context: unfinished 
housing developments and posters relating to them; statues, some religious, some not, and 
the Francoist civil war monument, the Valle de los Caidos; empty streets and rough 
sleepers; natural elements such as flowers, leaves or running water. Also interspersed with 
all the above are shots of a solitary African migrant, the most individualised protagonist, 
recounting his precarious life in Spain and his dangerous journey to the country. The latter 
seems to motivate shots of the coast and the sea. A potential bridge between the migrant 
and the occupation is provided by one of the small discussion groups which debates the 
need for the revolution to be mestiza, culturally hybrid, if it is to exist at all. A more indirect 
connection could be hypothesized between the migrant, the rough sleepers and the 
occupiers in relation to their precarious, unstable or improvised presence in urban spaces. 
But there is also an implicit invitation to see the occupation as an interruption and 
exception, something that cuts across the background of the financial crisis, the housing 
crash associated with it and other less progressive Spanish traditions and contains the 
potential to reorganize the elements surrounding it. It is here that the shots of nature 
perhaps fit in. Something new may be growing in the Spanish spring. The film, like 
Abendland, draws attention to the power of montage and its capacity to suggest 
relationships that exceed any particular image or setting, but here the suggested 
connections are more fluid, undoubtedly due to the film’s poetic nature and its refusal to 
develop the commanding or totalizing overview that would undermine its proximity and 
openness to what it is exploring.  
 
Insert figure 7 here: The collective body and its wall of sound, Vers Madrid, 2012. 
 
Insert figure 8 here: the enunciatory machinery of the occupation, Vers Madrid, 2012. 
 
 The film mobilises montage, other machinic elements and semiotic pluralism as it 
approaches the socio-political machinery of the occupation. Although some shots and 
sequences might seem to prioritize individual faces and voices, the framing, shot 
composition and editing together emphasize how individual elements are in fact subsumed 
as consenting cogs in the larger enunciatory machinery that surrounds them. Our attention 
is drawn to the temporary platform, the microphone, the person organising turn-taking, and 
the signer (figure 8). More importantly, we see multiple shots of the crowd. Some of these 
are medium shots of individual faces, or small groups, sitting on the ground, facing the 
speaker. Others are more general shots as the crowd responds through sounds or, more 
typically, gestures of assent or occasional disagreement (figure 9). While a conventional 
shot-reverse-shot organisation, returning repeatedly to a single listener, might suggest 
individual attention, here shots of speakers are typically followed by successive shots of 
different listeners, the editing thus emphasising the coming into being of a shared attention, 
itself a precondition for the formation of a collective voice which emerges, not from a single 
individual, but from the machinery of vocal and gestural enunciation and receptivity 
assembled by the occupation. It would be misleading, however, to overemphasize the voice 
to the exclusion of other elements of the collective body revealed by the film through its 
editing and its semiotic pluralism.  Through the sequences of dancing, singing, drumming, 
marching, running and struggle, and the shots emphasizing gestures, facial expression and 
the spatial disposition of groups, the film brings a mobile collective body into visibility and 
audibility.  This is not the fusional mass, class or national body that an earlier political 
cinema might have produced. It is an assembled body composed of reflective and 
consenting cogs in a way emphasized by the many close-ups or medium close-ups of 
pensive faces and the foregrounding of the machinery for the production of consensus. It is 
also an unstable and vulnerable body as shots of its improvised, impermanent spatial 
architecture and sequences of police repression underscore. If, an integral part of an 
ongoing revolutionary process, Vertov’s work could aspire to be the immanent self-
consciousness of a collective, here the relationship is less immediate. George’s film comes 
after the end of an occupation whose political legacy, whilst still developing, is uncertain. 
Yet, it nonetheless offers itself as a deferred self-consciousness to those of us pondering the 
shape a contemporary political movement should take, its own machinery and semiotic 
pluralism inviting us to develop not a platonic, or purely linguistic idea of what forms new 
collective bodies might take, but, as the risk of tautology, a felt sense of a corporeal, 
affective as well as cognitive assemblage.  
 
Insert figure 9 here: The eloquence of the collective body, Vers Madrid, 2012.  
  
Conclusion 
Inspired by Lazzarato and Beller, my earlier discussion might have seemed to suggest that, 
cinema was forever torn between the Vertovian and Eisensteinian poles as either the 
immanent self-consciousness of an emergent humano-machinic collective body, or a 
machinery for plugging into the human psyche and affectivity and putting them to work. 
What I have sought to develop through my analysis of Ma part du gâteau, Abendland, Lucy 
and Vers Madrid is a more nuanced sense of how cinema’s machinic powers and plural 
semiotic resources may be mobilised. Ma part du gâteau showed that, even in classically 
anthropocentric narratives, there is an undomesticated machinic and semiotic excess that, 
when subjected to ex-centric readings, may force other machineries into view. More 
systematically ex-centric with respect to mainstream cinema, Geyrhalter’s Abendland 
underscored how cinema’s own machineries (editing, the long take, the long shot, camera 
positioning) can be judiciously used to refuse anthropocentric perspectives and make our 
cog-like insertion into multiple machineries available for contemplation. Lucy provided a 
telling example of a cinema which uses all the machinic tools at its disposal to recentre the 
subject and to provide placatory representations, while implicitly acknowledging the radical 
disempowerment of contemporary human cogs. Finally, systematically ex-centric but also 
politically committed, Vers Madrid shows how cinema can connect its own machinery and 
semiotic pluralism to the machinery and semiotic diversity of an oppositional movement to 
help us see, feel and hear (and not simply represent) the form an oppositional body might 
take as it seeks to renew democratic forms. As it brings this collective subject into view, the 
film reminds us how, by becoming self-aware components of a progressive movement, we 
can move beyond the ultimately sterile opposition between individual subjects on the one 
hand and machinic cogs on the other, an opposition in the face of which, unable to imitate 
Lucy’s magical resolution of contradictions, we are always tempted to retreat to the familiar 
reassurance of established identities.   
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1 There is no attempt in this piece to develop an argument that might be somehow specific to European 
cinema. My hope is that will it have a broader valency. It could be argued nonetheless that my choice of films 
highlights some of the range and diversity of European film-making: Lucy, although French, has a distinctly 
Hollywood feel; Ma part du gâteau is a classic example of the middle-budget film-making that the French state 
support system helps survive; the avant-gardist and politically committed Vers Madrid also owes its existence, 
at least in part, to the French support system and its ability to find an audience to both a French state 
supported arthouse circuit and the international festival circuit; the only film of the four that takes Europe as 
its specific focus, a highly-creative documentary, Abendland is also the kind of European film that relies on the 
international arthouse and festival circuit. 
2 On moralism as anti-politics, see Brown (2001, 18-44).  
3 Michel Chion suggests that the soundscape of mainstream cinema works to centre the voice in the same way 
as its image centres the face (Chion 1999, 5-6). 
4 I take the notion of ex-centric cinema from Janet Harbord’s fine book (2016).  
5 Although the gendering of individualised subjects is not the focus of this piece, it is worth underscoring how, 
when they centre subjects, the films discussed work to cement existing gender identities. This is clear in Lucy. 
Despite what might be seen as her refreshing super-hero status, the main character moves from being an 
unaware consumer, a role often devolved to women, to becoming the maternal origin of new forms of life. 
The men play stereotypically masculine roles as scientist, policeman and (drug-lord) entrepreneur. Likewise, in 
Ma part du gâteau, as precarious worker and domestic cleaner, the lead character takes on roles often or 
stereotypically associated with women, even as the macho, risk-taking, unempathetic broker she tangles with 
clearly aligns with male stereotypes.  
                                                      
